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Abstract
For data pricing, data quality is a factor that must be considered.
To keep the fairness of data market from the aspect of data quality, we
proposed a fair data market that considers data quality while pricing.
To ensure fairness, we first design a quality-driven data pricing strategy.
Then based on the strategy, a fairness assurance mechanism for quality-
driven data marketplace is proposed. In this mechanism, we ensure that
savvy consumers cannot cheat the system and users can verify each con-
sumption with Trusted Third Party (TTP) that they are charged properly.
Based on this mechanism, we develop a fair quality-driven data market
system. Extensive experiments are performed to verify the effectiveness of
proposed techniques. Experimental results show that our quality-driven
data pricing strategy could assign a reasonable price to the data accord-
ing to data quality and the fairness assurance mechanism could effectively
protect quality-driven data pricing from potential cheating.
keywords: Data Marketing, Data Pricing, Data Quality, Fairness
1 Introduction
Trading of data is an effective way to show the value of big data. Online data
markets provide platform for data trading [17]. In data markets, data pricing
is an essential step and data quality is a factor to be considered during data
pricing.
Data quality is the fitness or suitability of data to meet business require-
ments [7]. Low-quality data tend to require additional “cleaning” which usually
costs much money and time. We use an example to illustrate the impact of data
quality on data price.
For example, the relation shown in Table 1 contains information about uni-
versities, like those sold at USNEWS1. Data shown in the table is apparently
∗Corresponding author: wangzh@hit.edu.cn
1http://www.usnews.com/education
1
ar
X
iv
:1
80
8.
01
62
4v
1 
 [c
s.D
B]
  5
 A
ug
 20
18
Table 1: University information
Uname Location Country Country Code Apply Deadline Min Score
t1 Uni A New York US 001 2013-Dec-25 90
t2 Uni B London UK 0044 12/12/2013 85
t3 Uni C New York US 002 3.5
of poor quality. t1 and t2 have different formats of time which need further
processing to uniform, while t3 lacks the value in the attribute which would
possibly make the data unusable. Meanwhile, although t1 and t3 share the same
“Country” value, they differ in the “Country Code” attribute. This violates the
functional dependency between these two attribute. The user has to purchase
extra data to correct the mistake. Also, the value of attribute “Min Score” of
t3 deviates obviously from that of other tuples. There is a great chance that the
deviation may be noise. As we can conclude, data quality greatly affects the
usability of data and extra expenditure of consumers.
Data cleaning is not a cheap step. It is estimated that data cleaning accounts
for 30%-80% of the development time in a data warehouse project [4]. Therefore,
low quality decreases the value of data since further efforts are required to clean
them. To show the impact of data quality on their value, data pricing should
take data quality into consideration.
Integrating quality factors in data pricing requires the re-consideration of
many properties of data market, among which fairness is significant one. In
data market, the fair value of a product is a rational and unbiased estimate of
the potential market price of a good, service, or asset. 2 First of all, to assure the
fairness in quality-based data market, a proper pricing strategy with the consid-
eration of data quality should be considered. Besides, with the consideration of
data quality in data pricing, some behaviors may affect the fairness. We use an
example to illustrate this point. For example, a buyer can try all the possible
combinations of parameters to find the “cheapest” tuple in a badly-designed
system. He will then use such set of parameters to obtain unfair advantage over
other users.
The requirement of a fair quality-based data market brings two main tech-
nical challenges. One is how to integrate quality factors into pricing process of
data. The other is how to provide a cheat-free fair quality-based data market.
This paper studies the fairness of quality-based data market. As far as we
know, this is the first work that considers overall quality factor in pricing of
data markets and the fairness of quality-based data market. This is the first
contribution of this paper.
We assure the fairness in two aspects. The first is the data pricing strategy
with the consideration of data quality. In our strategy, data of better quality can
be sold at a higher price and buyers pay less for poor-quality data. A purposed
quality-based pricing system takes as input the respective need of consumers and
derives the price for the particular user. The underlying idea is that different
2http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair value
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consumers and applications may have their own emphasis on important quality
factors. A proper quality-based data pricing strategy is the second contribution
of this paper.
The other aspect is a mechanism that prevents savvy buyer from using for-
mer query knowledge to trick the system. With such trading mechanism, savvy
buyers cannot get lower price of the same content by a maliciously designed
query. The trading mechanism that prevents the cheating is the third contribu-
tion of this paper.
1.1 Organization
In section 2, we define the problems of this paper and discuss the related as-
sumptions. Our quality-based data pricing framework consists of two parts:
quantization and quality-based floating. The framework of quality-related data
pricing strategy is described in Section 3. In Section 4, we depict the mecha-
nisms used in our marketplace to prevent savvy user from cheating the market
management system in the context of our definition of “cheat-free”. In Section 5,
we evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our system by experiments. The
related work is summarized in Section 6. Section 7 conclusions the paper.
2 Background and Problem Definitions
In this section, we introduce the background of data market and define the
problems studied in this paper.
Several pricing models have been proposed for data markets. Among them,
the query-based pricing framework [?,10] is an effective and flexible one. Query-
based pricing framework can derive the price of a query automatically once given
explicit price points. In such framework, a seller is not required to define a fixed
set of views that the buyer may be interested in and assign specific price to each
of them. Meanwhile, the data buyer can avoid scanning through the catalog or
bing forced to accept the superset of interested data. He can get exactly what
he wants by issuing queries according to his need. The charge of the results
of the query is automatically calculated with the system. Thus we choose the
query-based framework in our system.
In a data market, users always expect real-time interaction. This requires
the pricing in data market to be either very efficient or performed offline. Since
in the query-based framework, the price of data depends on the submitted query
and should be computed online, we choose an instance-based manner to compute
the quality offline to save the total computation time. By stating instance-
based pricing, we imply that the results of the quality-based pricing system are
determined by the quality of the whole database instance, and perform similarly
to every query on the instance.
In a data market, the fair value of a data set is the amount at which it could
be bought or sold in a current transaction among willing parties, or transferred
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to an equivalent party, other than in a liquidation sale [1]. Following this con-
cept, for a quality-based data market, fairness means that users and applications
with different requirements pay a price for the data according to their needs on
data quality. For example, a buyer who needs the most updated data would
like to pay a higher price for the query results on the latest data set with good
“timeliness” quality aspect [15] since this one possibly satisfies his requirement.
On the contrary, he would be charged less if the data are of poor “timeliness”
because the data set may be out-of-date and could not provide the much useful
information for him.
Since data quality has different aspects, a user may emphasize on some
special aspect. Consider the example shown in table 1. If one just want to
count the number of universities in a certain country, clearly, the format of
“Apply Deadline” or the accuracy value of “Min Score” would not affect the
result. However if the data are not complete in the attribute “Country”, the
counting result is inaccurate. Therefore, the factors such as consistency and
accuracy are not as important as completeness in this case.
As a result, embedding data quality in data pricing requires a quality-based
pricing strategy investigating various quality factors such as accuracy and com-
pleteness and then combine them. Assigning different weights for different qual-
ity factors according to the requirements of users is the first problem which is
to be solved in Section 3.
Such framework will lead to an unfair problem. Consider the following ex-
ample scenario. A savvy user can maliciously issue queries claiming different
needs, then he can cheat the system by inferring the distributions of quality
factors of the underlying database with some designed queries. For instance, a
user can compare prices of the same query content with different distribution of
quality aspects. He may discover that the database has a highest “consistency”
score if the price of the query results on the data emphasizing “consistency” is
the highest.
With the distributions of quality factors, the user can pay relative lower
price for required data. In the example above, he could issue his query claiming
that he care about the completeness of data most which may belies his true
need to obtain the data in lower price. Therefore, beside a quality-based pricing
strategy, mechanism assuring that the quality-based data market to be “cheat-
free” is the second problem that is studied in Section 4.
3 Quality-Based Pricing
In this section, we propose a quality-based pricing strategy for fair data mar-
ket. To integrate data quality factors in the pricing, data quality should be
described separately in aspects at first, which is discussed in Section 3.1. Sec-
tion 3.2 discusses the way to integrate and calculate the overall quality value of
a dataset for a particular user. Final data price could be computed according to
both of the quantitative data quality and original query price. The final price
computation method will be presented in Section 3.3.
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We first design the quantitative description for each data quality aspect
respectively and consider them all together.
3.1 Quality Aspects
We have two considerations on quantization. One is efficiency. In a data mar-
ket, the data quality information will be computed quantitatively with new
submission of data and the size of data may be large, the data quality eval-
uation algorithm should be cheap to assure the efficiency of the data market.
The other is the diversity issue due to the various aspects of data quality. The
quantitative description of the data quality should be the combination of vari-
ous data quality aspects with different weights. It requires that values of these
aspects to fall in similar ranges and follow similar formats.
We investigate the quality of data in the following four aspects: accuracy,
completeness, timeliness, consistency. We choose these factors for two reasons.
One is that these attributes are among the most often investigated data quality
factors [6,15]. The other is that these factors are closely related to the value of
the data and influence the price. Violating them may cause direct financial loss
or even worse consequences.
Other quality factors either are not directly related to data pricing or overlap
with our choice. For examples, “Accessibility” [15] is the quality aspect that
does not directly affect the price, and “Appropriate Amount of Data” [15] is
overlapping with “completeness”.
When we are investigating the four quality aspects in the following para-
graphs, we will be focusing on the violation value Ks. They represent the
overall extent to which the restrictions are violated. In other words, it shows
how bad the quality is in certain aspects and is reflects the efforts one will need
to clean them.
Assume that the schema of the database has m attributes R = (R1, ..., Rm).
Database instance D = (RD1 , R
D
2 , ..., R
D
m) is a instance of R. Assume D has n
tuples.
3.1.1 Accuracy
Accuracy [5, 15, 19] of data refers to the extent to which data are free of error.
To measure the accuracy of data, we need to spot and count the appearance
of inaccuracy in the set. We judge the validation of data according to type,
formats and pre-defined patterns. To locate inaccurate data, we need to first
analyze the data with pattern analysis, domain analysis and data type analysis.
Here pattern analysis discovers patterns of records by analyzing the data stored
in the attributes, domain analysis identifies a domain or set of commonly used
values within the attribute by capturing the most frequently occurring values,
and data type analysis enables the system to discover information about the
data types found in the attribute [20]. Then after the pattern, domain and
type of every attribute is obtained, we check the value of each attribute in all
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tuples in a data set and if one of the following metrics are satisfied, this value
is considered as inaccurate.
• It violates the pattern of the attribute. Patterns can be expressed as reg-
ular expressions. For example, a valid date can be expresses by “\d{4} −
\d{2} − \d{2}”. If such patterns are set, a date “98-01-01” is considered
a violation.
• It exceeds the valid data domain. For example, a negative number is an
inaccurate age attribute, since it is out of the valid domain of rational age
value.
• The data are of wrong types. An example is that a string type in a column
that is required to be integer.
We denote the number of all the inaccurate values by nac. Then we use
the ratio of the inaccurate values to evaluate the inaccuracy of the whole data
set. To avoid extreme values in each data quality aspect, we choose negative
logarithm of the original ratios as the uniform form. The accuracy violation
rate is computed as
K1 = Kacc = − log(nac
mn
). (1)
With such form, the quality values fall in a reasonable range and more accurate
data sets get higher K1 values.
3.1.2 Completeness
Completeness [8, 15, 21] of a data set is the extent to which the data are not
missing, and are of sufficient breadth and depth for the task. To measure the
degree of completeness, we need to examine if the data set is satisfactory in three
aspects, (1) appropriate amount, (2) adequate attributes, and (3) few missing
values. All these three aspects influence the usability of data set.
First, the volume of a database should reach a minimal number to be mean-
ingful. For example, statistical data of teenager health condition in a city can-
not just contain 10 tuples. We measure the degree that a data set violates the
appropriate amount requirement with the degree that the volume violating the
minimal required number of a data set. Thus such degree is computed as bnminn c,
where nmin is the minimum record number of a certain genre of data. In the
case discussed above, nmin may be a number of the same order of magnitude
as the number of teenagers of a typical city. With such formula, if the volume
of the data set is sufficient, the result is 0 and it has no impact on the value
of completeness. With nmin as a constant, the smaller n is, the larger
nmin
n is.
Thus when nminn > 1, this formula shows the degree of violation.
Second, data tables should contain adequate attributes to assure that it
delivers effective information. In this example, table of health condition should
at least contain the attributes “age” and “gender”. The degree of the violation
of this property is measured as the ratio of uncovered attributes to necessary
attributes. With Rnec = {R1, R2, ..., Rp} as the necessary set of attributes of
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a certain data genre, the number of attributes that lies in the necessary set
is denoted by p′. Then the violation degree of this property is p−p
′
p . In the
example above, if the data set to evaluate only has the “age” attribute but
lacks “gender”, then we have p = 2, p′ = 1. The violation degree is 0.5.
Third, the existence of missing values may lead to incapability to answer
certain query or lead to incomplete query results. The numbers of three aspects
are counted quantitatively according to following rules, respectively. We use the
ratio of missing values nmismn to describe the violation degree of this property,
where nmis is the number of missing values.
Summing of these factors, we compute the incompleteness of a data set in
the following way.
The relative importance of the three aspects of data completeness are de-
scribed as weights wcom1 , wcom2 , wcom3 . The distribution is also determined by
the specific need of data consumers or derived automatically from feedback of
users by machine learning algorithms. Following the same format with accuracy
value, the completeness violation rate is computed as
K2 =Kcom
=− log(wcom1 ∗ b
nmin
n
c+ wcom2 ∗
p− p′
p
+ wcom3 ∗
nmis
mn
).
(2)
3.1.3 Timeliness
Timeliness [15,18] refers to the degree of data to be up-to-date for a particular
task. Including the evaluation of timeliness in the quality assessment makes the
results with expire data get lower price.
To evaluate the aspect of timeliness, we count the number of expired values
nexp according to the effective time of the particular data genre. The timeliness
violation rate value is calculate as
K3 = Ktim = − log(nexp
mtn
), (3)
where mt refers to the number of tuples with effective timestamps. nexp can be
computed by checking whether the result of current time minus the timestamp
on the data is larger than the expiration time. This equation still follows the
form above and gives higher degree for data set with fewer expired data.
3.1.4 Consistency
Consistency of data refers to the extent to which the data conform to the func-
tional dependency and conditional function dependency of database.
First we investigate the data set using methods from [2] and discover the
tuples violating the functional dependencies and conditional function dependen-
cies. Then we calculate the number of tuples that violate the function depen-
dency and conditional function dependency as nvio . Following the common
form we have
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K4 = Kcon = − log(nvio
n
). (4)
3.2 Integrating
In defining the quality of data, we use the cost of cleaning to as a measurement.
Since the data quality affects data value such way: data of low quality tend to
require more cleaning by the consumer which may cost a lot of money and time.
So it is reasonable for consumers to pay more for data they can use right after
purchase or need only slight cleaning.
To combine various factors, we choose the linear sum of the evaluated data
qualities as the skeleton according to the Occam’s razor principle. That is,
when there is no golden rule to judge different methods, we choose a simple
way . Relative importance of data quality aspects is determined by the buyers
according to their requirement. To represent it, we require the buyer of data
to state a weight vector [w1, w2, w3, w4] that indicates the weights of the four
aspects mentioned above and satisfies w1 +w2 +w3 +w4 = 1. The distribution
of weight shows the relative concern of the buyer.
As discussed, consumers may emphasize on different quality aspects accord-
ing to different application background. The difference is denoted by weight
vector W . We could not expect that every consumer got the ability to precisely
quantify their need based on particular application and give a relative weight
to each quality aspect on their own. So the system assists their users by giving
advices.
Consider an example in which a consumer is particularly concerned about
the completeness of data, he would certainly spend more time on making data
more complete after his purchase. Now there are three general types of clean-
ing approaches regarding completeness: 1) ignore all the records with missing
values; 2) fill missing ones with a special value; 3) capture the missing values.
The third approach gives the most accurate cleaning results while at the same
time costs the most. So if a user needs the data to be very complete, he may
perform the third approach; if he just need the active parts of data and doesn’t
care about completeness, he may simply discard the incomplete tuples. In other
words, the consumer knows which level of cleaning he would like to pay for each
quality aspect.
The system evaluates the potential cost of typical cleaning methods and
archive them in different levels. Then the system gives weight ranges of corre-
sponding levels. The user finds the level according to such guide and still have
the freedom to change slightly with in the range. We continue with the example
with completeness, the system could give four types of methods and their corre-
sponding weight range: 1) ignore all the records with missing values, [0, 0.1); 2)
fill missing ones with special value, [0.1, 0.2); 3) capture missing values through
statistic methods, [0.2, 0.3); 4) capture missing values through machine learn-
ing methods, [0.3, 0.4). If a consumer need the dataset to be very complete,
and he would use the most expensive type of cleaning method, he could set the
weight of completeness to 0.35, for example. Then if the data set he purchased
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happened to be low quality especially on completeness, he gets the results at a
lower price. The price in some way “compensate” the potential loss due to the
heavy cleaning need.
For the j-th level in the i-th quality aspect, the system got an offline-
generated cleaning cost function fij(K,D, V ). These are the estimated time
consumption functions of different cleaning methods. With the relative weight
of the i-th quality aspect wi, the system choose the suitable fij according to the
range r that wi falls into:Fi((Ki, Di, Vi), wi) = fis(Ki, Di, Vi),where wi ∈ rs.
And the final quality value is FQ =
∑4
1 Fi((Ki, Di, Vi), wi)wi.
3.3 Floating
This section combines the quality factors evaluated with the methods in Sec-
tion 3.2 into the data price. The data price change caused by data quality
is called floating. The computation of quantitative floating requires the com-
bination of multiple data quality factors and distinguishes the importance of
different aspects of data quality according to the requirement.
In order to achieve fairness in a particular data market, we also need a set
of standard quality values S = (S1, S2, S3, S4) which shows the average level
of quality in the market to make the floating of prices according to the same
baseline. This baseline could be computed as the average quality of all current
databases in the market.
With the set of quality assessment result K of a database instance and the
vector W = [w1, w2, w3, w4] as the weights of a particular buyer, the system then
calculates the price floating and performs it on the original query price. The
price floating is computed in two steps. In the first step, the quality factor of
a database instance FQ is computed as shown in Section 3.2 and the standard
quality of all databases FQS are computed in similar ways, using S instead
of W . User can choose wi according to their own need or rely on automatic
algorithms that give suggestions based on former records. In the second step,
the price is computed with the original price p of query results and the floating
computed with FQ and FQS .
For the second step, there are two natural ways to perform the floating.
• additive floating
we calculate the price as
pad = p + (FQ− FQS) ∗ E, (5)
where E is a coefficient of the data market to indicate how much the
quality may affect the final price. E is the part of the initial settings of
the whole data market. However, the drawback of such floating manners
is that it influences cheaper data more than expensive data. For instance,
with FQ = 1.5, FQS = 1, an adding floating E ∗(FQ−FQS) = 0.5 would
change a query worth $2 to $2.5, while changes a query worth $2000 only
to $2000.5.
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• multiplicative floating
we calculate the price as
pmul =
FQ
FQS
∗ p. (6)
Similarly, such manners may also cause problems. It tend to influence
price of expensive data too dramatically. For the example above, a mul-
tiplicative floating FQFQS = 1.5 changes price $2 to $3, while a price $2000
would end up to be $3000.
To overcome the drawbacks, we the combined manners of additive and multi-
plicative. The final price is computed as
pfinal = p +
(FQ− FQS)
FQS
∗ pC, (7)
where C is a coefficient of the data market to indicate the quality may affect
the final price. For the stated example, if we choose C = 0.1, $2 is changed to
$2.1 and $2000 to $2100. C can be adjusted according to the level of quality
requirement.
In the pricing strategy, consumers can choose to use default values for the
whole set of parameters or modify part of them. The modification can be done
with the help of algorithms that give suggestion based on former records.
4 Cheat-free data marketplace
As discussed in Section 2, a savvy buyer may cheat the data market on the
weights of data quality factors when the pricing strategy in Section 3 is applied
directly. In order to keep the fairness of the data markets, in this section, we
propose the cheat-avoiding mechanism.
4.1 Fairness Criterion
At first, we discuss how to evaluate the fairness in presence of the impact of
data quality on data pricing.
In Section 2, we show that the unfairness of quality-based pricing is caused
by the fact that uses can get lower price by cheating the system. From this
perspective, we evaluate fairness of data market by the ability of users to cheat.
Formally, if a data market satisfies that a buyer cannot get a set W ′ with
the knowledge of real weight vector W and assure that
4∑
1
Fi((Ki, Di, Vi), w
′
i)w
′
i <
4∑
1
Fi((Ki, Di, Vi), wi)wi, (8)
then such data market is considered as cheat-free in terms of quality-based data
market.
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Such criterion describes the desired fair feature for data market that a savvy
buyer cannot consciously construct a fake input to get lower price than what
he really deserves. Violating the criterion shows the user’s the ability to cheat
the system. Note that consciousness is important in the criterion. Since in our
system which will be discussed in Section 4.2, the user is unconscious about the
mapping of weight vector of a query and the price of it. In fact the mapping
would give a savvy user advantage over other user.
Also, we may want to guarantee that individual user cannot be cheated by
the data market. A user can archive and verify the consumption record to ensure
the fairness of the data market.
4.2 Data Market Working Flow
4.2.1 Main Idea
To achieve the goal described in Section 4.1, we propose a fair data market.
Generally, a data market contains three parties: the data vendors who pro-
vide data and decides the individual point of price of his database, the data
buyers who issue queries on the specific database and get charged, the market
managing system (MMS) as a platform which performs all the query procedure
and quality-related calculations. Also, to provide protection for all sides, we
introduce a trusted third party (TTP) into our system. TTP is a trusted, un-
biased and authenticated third party who can communicate with other parties
and provide arbitration.
Most of the services that ensure fairness is provided by MMS and TTP. Thus
the mechanism is included in MMS and TTP as components.
The major mechanism for fairness is the hiding the mapping from price to
weight vector, which prevents the buyer from detecting any useful information
about the quality distribution of the database he queries. This goal is achieved
in our mechanism by avoid revealing the precise final query price to the buyer,
and is implemented by encrypting the query price. While at the same time, a
buyer may want to make sure that MMS cannot cheat by providing fake price.
This requires the user to verify the correctness of the consumption without
decrypting the price.
We design the work flow in this section. First, we sketch the behaviors of
the users and the data market with such mechanism as shown in Figure 4.2.2.
In the work flow, each user gets an account at the data market and get
tokens certificated by the market to replace money in data consumptions. We
assume that the communication takes place in a secure and authenticated chan-
nel. Every time a query is issued, the buyer gets a range instead of an explicit
price. If he accepts the price range, the price will be deducted from the account.
A user can usually check the range of his balance instead of a precise number.
Thus the user will not be able to detect the mapping between the weight vector
he submits and the outcoming price.
After a successful consumption, the buyer may want to check if MMS took
the right amount of money from his account. He can perform the verifica-
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tion himself through simple and efficient calculation. When he needs to verify
whether the encrypted balance is correct or the encrypted price is really within
the range MMS claims, the buyer communicates with TTP. TTP performs the
verification through communication with MMS and returns a result to the buyer.
4.2.2 Functions
The work flow of Data Market.
Before the whole work flow is proposed, we introduce the functions used
in the flow. In these functions, Gn denotes a multiplicative group of integers
modulo n.
(i, gi, ski , pubi) ← Reg(1s): An algorithm performed by MMS that takes as
input the security parameter and generates a unique identify number for a par-
ticular consumer. For the security parameter s, p has s bits and is the order of
the group Gn, ie.p = |G|. User ID i ∈ Zp. It also outputs gi ∈ G together with
the secret key and public key of the buyer.
(Evalue) ← Enc(i, value): A deterministic algorithm that encrypts the price
value or balance value of the particular user with user ID i. It returns Evalue =
gvaluei .
(range) ← Range(i, p): A probabilistic algorithm performed by MMS that
output a range where p ∈ range.
(res, p) ← Query(q,W ): A deterministic algorithm performed by MMS that
takes as input the query q to a certain database and the vector W = [w1, w2, w3, w4],
and computes the result set res of the query together with the final result of the
quality-based pricing system of the query p. It returns res and p.
(consumptionID,Ep, res) ← Consume(i, confirmi, q,W ): A deterministic
algorithm performed by MMS that takes as input the confirm information of user
i and query information (q,W ) on which the consumer agreed on. It generates
12
a unique ID for the consumption, encrypts Ep = Enc(p, i), and performs the
query by running Query. It finally returns the consumption ID, the encrypted
price and the query results. At the same time saves the record and sends it to
TTP for archiving.
YES—NO← Verify(EB1, EP , EB2) : A deterministic algorithm performed
by the buyer that takes as input the encrypted form of original balance, the price
of the query and new balance after the query succeeded. It returns “YES” if
EB1 ∗ (EB2)−1 = Ep. The inverse of EB2 can be computed using the Extended
Euclid algorithm.
YES—NO ← checkBalance(i, EB): A deterministic algorithm that per-
formed by TTP to check whether the provided value is the encrypted form of
user ID i. It returns “YES” if EB = Enc(Bi, i), where Bi is the current balance
of user i. Since TTP is tracing every consumption record, it always gets the
most updated user balance.
YES—NO← VerifyRange(consumptionID, i, range,EP ) : A deterministic
algorithm performed by TTP that takes as input the encrypted form of a price
and the claimed range with its consumption ID and user ID. It outputs “YES”
if the price is in the range. To void the case that the user maliciously utilizes
TTP to narrow the range of Ep or even reveals the value of p, TTP searches
the consumption records by the provided consumption ID to verify if the input is
legal. According the result record of such search, when any of the range and user
ID in the record does not match corresponding item provided by the buyer input,
“No” is returned. If both of them match, the checking continues. It returns
“YES” if p ∈ range and Ep = Enc(p, i) and range matches.
4.2.3 Working Stages
The system runs in the following stages.
• Setup: We assume that all roles including data vendors, MMS and TTP
have already got their key pairs of public key and private key. Also they
are acknowledged of the public key information of others through offline
procedures or with the help of public key infrastructure, for example the
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure [14, 16]. To start the trading, the data
vendor provides his database with explicit price points to MMS. MMS
stores and investigates the quality information of the database instance.
A user who wants to buy data from the market will need to register first.
MMS runs Reg on the security parameter s and saves the register informa-
tion to his database. MMS also sends the information to TTP for future
reference.
• Query: The buyer forms a query q and also determines the vector of
weight distribution W . He sends (q,W ) to MMS and waits at the range
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of the query price. MMS then performs the query, calculates query price,
computes final price according to quality with the weight given by the
buyer, ie. run Query on (q,W ). MMS sends back the price range and
encrypted price (Range(p),Enc(p, i)). If the buyer agrees on the price in
this range, he sends back an agreement message. Then MMS updates
the user’s current balance, and sends back the result, unique consumption
ID together with price and current balance both in encrypted form. The
user saves the encrypted consumption record for possible future verifica-
tion. MMS sends consumption information to TTP after every successful
consumption.
• Verification: Since the buyer possesses access to consumption only in
encrypted form, he may want to verify if his balance is properly pro-
cessed. The buyer can require his current balance in encrypted form EB
at any stage. So for every consumption he made, the buyer has got tu-
ple (EB1, EP , EB2), and he may run Verify on the tuple. If Verify returns
“YES”, the buyer is convinced that the price of the consumption he made
is properly subtracted from his balance.
• Record Checking with TTP: TTP as a trusted party can provide ad-
ditional checking based on user information from MMS and consumption
record provided by the buyer.
– A buyer needs to check the reliability of the original encrypted bal-
ance so that the following verification is convincing. The same check-
ing is needed when the user made a recharge to his account. He could
run checkBalance.
– A buyer may want to know whether the price of a certain query is
really in the range claimed by MMS, then he can send the consump-
tion ID, encrypted price, the claimed range of MMS and his own ID
to TTP. TTP runs VerifyRange and returns the answer.
Since each of the function runs in polynomial time complexity in the security
parameter s, as mentioned in the interaction stages above, each of above stage
can be accomplished in polynomial time.
We use an example to illustrate the above flow. Alice is a buyer who has
registered at a data market with the proposed fairness assurance mechanism
and gets a user ID i = 1. Assume that the data market is running on a group
Gn with n = 5. Assume that Alice get g1 = 3, which is only known by MMS and
TTP. Now the balance in her account is $4, she queries MMS for the encrypted
balance. MMS computes EB1 = g
4
1 mod 5 = 1 and send it back to Alice.
Then Alice issues a query with quality weight vector (q,W ) to buy data on the
market for query q with quality preference W . MMS performs the query and
calculates the price p = 3, it runs range and get range = [1, 4] and compute
Ep = g
3
1 mod 5 = 2. Then MMS sends back the range and encrypted price to
Alice, and waits for her agreement. Alice agrees on the price range and sends
back the agreement message. MMS subtracts the price from her balance and
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sends the query result, encrypted price Ep and new balance EB2 to her together
with a unique consumptionID to identify the consumption, where EB2 = g
4−3
1
mod 5 = 3.
To verify that the new balance is correct, Alice first computes the inverse of
Ep using the Extended Euclid algorithm and gets (Ep)
−1 = 2. Then she can
verify whether EB1∗Ep−1 = EB2, which is 1∗2 = 2 in our case. Now Alice knows
that she is charged properly. Also, she can check her balance with TTP before
any consumption every time she recharges the account. After consumption, she
can check the range of the price by querying TTP with consumptionID, range,
and encrypted price of the consumption.
In real-world implementations, the group will be much bigger according to
the security parameter to ensure the difficulty of discrete logarithm.
On the data market, a cheater Bob wants to issue query with a fake weight
vector to get a cheaper price. To achieve this goal, he has to know which quality
aspects of the underlying database instance are higher and put relatively low
weight on these aspects. However, since Bob cannot solve the discrete logarithm
problem, he does not know the real prices of the results of his queries. Thus he
cannot detect the quality distributions of underlying data sets. We will prove in
Section 4.3 that under such circumstance, Bob has no effective advantage over
a random guesser.
Bob may want to construct fake range checking messages to query TTP.
For example, if there is a consumption record for Bob with consumptionID =
2, p = 3, range = [1, 4]. He could query TTP first with consumptionID =
2, Ep, [2.5, 4], badly designed TTP will return Yes. Bob finds out that p > 2.5,
then he queries with consumptionID = 2, Ep, [2.5, 3.25]. After narrowing the
range step by step, he could guess the real price. However, in the mechanism of
our system, TTP is required to verify the range before verifying it, only ranges
appearing in real consumption records are accepted. In this case, TTP searches
the consumption records for the one with consumptionID = 2, TTP only sends
back the result to those with Ep, [1, 4], but it refuses to answer any other range
query for such consumptionID. Thus Bob cannot get additional information
about the price range by playing with the system.
Note that in real-world implementations, the group should be much larger
according to the security parameter to ensure the difficulty of discrete logarithm
for its security.
4.3 Reliability of the Mechanism
In this subsection, we show the reliability of the proposed mechanism.
As shown in Section 4.1, the reliability of the mechanism is describd by the
criterion.
A discrete logarithm is an integer k solving the equation bk = g, where b and
g are elements of a group. Discrete logarithms are thus the group-theoretic ana-
logue of ordinary logarithms, which solve the same equation for real numbers
b and g, where b is the base of the logarithm and g is the value whose loga-
rithm is being taken. Computing discrete logarithms is believed to be difficult.
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No efficient general method for computing discrete logarithms on conventional
computers is known.3
Based on the difficulty of solving discrete logarithm problem, a polynomial
time attacker cannot get the value of certain balance or price with a possibility
that is a non-negligible function of security parameter s. So with only encrypted
price and balance, the user can no longer detect the quality distribution of the
underlying database.
Furthermore, we have the following theorem. For the interest of space, we
omit the proof.
Theorem 1. Without knowledge of relationship between different factors of a
particular database instance, the possibility that an attacker can cheat the system
is equal to random guessing W .
One may argue that without knowledge of the quality distribution, the buyer
may issue n query with different W values and may hope to get a lower sum of
price than these n queries. The problem can be reduced to what stated above,
to determine (
∑n
j=1 wij −nwi) for all i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. And the possibility is still
equal to random selection.
5 Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the system in this section. Our system is imple-
mented on a database management system(DBMS) and interacts with users in
roles of data vendors and data consumers.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The system is implemented in python and runs on top of the MySQL DBMS.
We evaluate our system using data that are sold on real-world data markets
of AggData4 and the Windows Azure Marketplace5. Five data sets are chosen,
including Location of UK Universities, Historical Weather Data, Country Codes,
GDP All Industries Per States of US 1997-2011, Complete List of Philanthropy
400 Organizations 2004-2010.
Our system runs on a laptop with 2.5GHZ Core i3 CPU and 8GB of RAM.
In our system, all the parameters are stored in a configuration file together
with information about the database. These parameters include the valid pat-
terns of a particular attributes or functional dependencies between attributes.
In our experiments, we set these parameters manually based on the schema of
the data. Take the data set of philanthropy records for example. The schema
of the data set is (Year, Rank, OrganizationID, OrganizationName, Organiza-
tionLocation, PrivateIncome, TotalAssets, ServiceExpense, Fundraising). We
manually set the parameter C = 0.05, S = [2.5, 2, 1.5, 2], and set the expire
3http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discrete logarithm
4http://www.aggdata.com/
5https://datamarket.azure.com/
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Table 2: Time cost
University Weather Country GDP Philanthropy
Rows 590 20750 206 72900 2798
Colums 12 17 27 8 9
Average Proc Time 0.075 1.248 0.100 4.230 0.268
Average Query Time 0.037 0.024 0.010 0.054 0.015
time to 6 years, minimum record number nmin = 200, necessary attribute set
Rnec = {OrganizationName, Fundraising}. Parameter sets in real world im-
plementation can be generated in the same way or in manners with more human
involvement.
5.2 Efficiency
We first evaluate the performance of the system with different database instance
sizes and attribute numbers. In the experiments, we commit different databases
to the system and issue various selection queries. We measure the time to finish
the preprocessing of databases, in other words, the time to evaluate the quality
of the database instance. Then we measure the query time. The results are
shown in Table 2.
As depicted in the table 2, for 3 of the 5 data sets, the system can finish
the preprocessing within 1 second. The slower two are still less than 5 seconds.
This makes the system suitable for large data sets. Also since the processing
time is short, the system can deal with updates efficiently simply by repeat the
evaluation process. As for query times, all the queries that we tested can be
done within 0.1 second. Hence queries can be online processed.
5.3 Effectiveness
Then we evaluate the effectiveness of the system. Since the price of the same
query result set on the same database can be different based on the need of
consumers, there is no deterministic way to check the correctness. However, we
will evaluate the pricing system in two ways.
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Distributions
of Query Price with Randomly chose W : (a) philanthropy, (b) university, (c)
weather, (d) GDP, (e) country code.
The first is the intuition that prices of a particular query with different
parameter should follow the normal distribution [3]. Since most of the price
should fall near the original query price (without quality float), the requirement
of the price with quality floating is that only a few data with extreme quality
conditions or for users of special need should fall far against the expectation. We
experimented on each database with 200 randomly chosen weight distribution
W . The results are depicted in Figure 5.3. As we can see, most of the five cases
follow the normal pattern. From this observation, the prices provided by our
system coincide to the requirement and are in reasonable distribution.
The second is to test the relationship of data prices and data quality. To
avoid the influence of original query price, we test on same query on the same
database instance. By randomly adding mistakes in the data set, we manually
decrease the quality.
From the results shown in Figure 5.3, it is observed that the query prices
decrease with the amount of the adding of mistakes for all data sets. This shows
that our pricing strategy can effectively show the quality factors.
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Quality Eval-
uation while Adding Mistakes: (a) philanthropy, (b) university, (c) weather, (d)
GDP, (e) country code.
5.4 Reliability
Then we evaluate the reliability of our data market experimentally where users
try to cheat the system. We compare the results with the parameters chosen
by a human and generated randomly. When a certain user issues a query, a W
according to the requirement is generated , but this use still wants to have a try
to play with the system. W can be modified to W ′ and the user tries to cheat
the system to get a cheaper price. We exam the capability of the user to cheat
by comparing the results with randomly chosen W ′, as shown in Figure 5.4.
Deviation
from Real Price while Playing with System for Human vs. Random Generator:
(a) philanthropy, (b) university, (c) weather, (d) GDP, (e) country code.
The y-axis of these figures is the difference between the experimental price
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derived from W ′ and the real price derived from W . It is shown that even
with the knowledge of the real W , the user has no significant advantages over
randomly chosen W to get lower price.
6 Related work
Data pricing and data quality are research topics related to this paper. We
summarize related results of these issues.
[?] explored the common models of data pricing in earth observation. Then
research about data marketplaces emerge as data is more commonly accepted
as good for trading. [17] identified several categories of data marketplaces and
pricing models and provided a snapshot of the situation as of Summer 2012. [10]
introduced the “Query-Based” pricing model which made the pricing process of
data more flexible. They also developed practical pricing system based on the
theory [11].There have been other investigations related to the pricing of aggre-
gate Queries [13] and private data [12]. However, none of these research works
related to data pricing or data market has taken data quality into consideration.
Data quality itself is a research area. Using an analogy between product
manufacturing and data manufacturing, [21] developed a framework for ana-
lyzing data quality research. [15] described principles that can develop usable
data quality metrics [5, 8]. [9] deeply investigated individual aspects of data
quality such as completeness, accuracy and consistency. These work presented
accurate ways to determine data quality of respective aspects. However, these
mechanisms are not suitable for our system for two reasons. First, most of
these algorithms are rather complicated which are too much time-consuming
for real-world data markets. Second, the studies are based on individual as-
pects of quality and are often with results of different formats and scales. While
in quality-based data markets, a combined quality value is needed.
7 Conclusion
Data quality and fairness are neglected in current data market. To make data
markets more effective, we presented a fair data market that considers data
quality during pricing in this paper. To ensure fairness, we first design a quality-
driven data pricing strategy. Then we propose a fairness assurance mechanism
for quality-driven data marketplace based on the strategy. In this mechanism,
we introduced Trusted Third Party (TTP) to ensure that savvy consumers can-
not cheat the system, while at the same time users can verify each consumption
with TTP that they are charged properly. Based on this mechanism, we de-
velop a fair quality-driven data market system. Experimental results show that
our system could generate a fair price with the consideration of data quality
efficiently and the fairness assurance mechanism is effective.
Interesting future work includes the the following topics. The first topic is
the consideration of data quality rules other than FDs and CFDs. We may
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investigate data consistency in a wider range including matching dependencies,
editing rules, denial constraints and so on. The second topic is query-based
quality evaluation. This requires evaluation of data quality every time a query is
issued which may lead to large respond time, integrating the quality information
of particular query with its underlying database instance, and the reduction
strategy of MMS server and TTP server workload by batch query processing
and verification. The third topic is machine learning algorithms that analyze
purchasing records of consumers and derive parameters automatically for them.
So that the consumers need not to set parameters such as W manually. Another
future work is to design more effective quality evaluation algorithms for data
markets.
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